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ABSTRACT: This article argues that Rousseau's endorsement of male domination and his illiberal views of rape, punishment and the education of women have been seriously underestimated by twentieth-century commentators who tend to produce expositions of his work that evade, ignore or marginalize this 'darker side' of his educational philosophy. 






Trends in British primary education can be understood as movements towards, or away from, Rousseau's philosophy of teaching. Lambasted in the Black Papers in the 1960s and 70s this philosophy has been a major influence on what has been called 'the culture of primary education' (Alexander, 1992). Despite the impact of recent government policies, the insights Rousseau provided have left a permanent mark. Four key ideas - now widely accepted, if not always so widely implemented - can he traced back to Emile: 

	The need to be realistic about what is, and what is not, within the child's intellectual grasp; 
	The usefulness of 'readiness' as a concept to mark the stage at which it is fruitful to introduce some new material or skill; 
	The importance of basing what is to be learned on the child's own experience; 
	The value of taking time to ensure genuine understanding rather than accelerating the pace in learning.  

Rousseau changed our understanding of children's education. As one commentator put it: 

…Emile was by far the most considerable book written on the Eighteenth century: judged by effects on thought indeed, perhaps the most considerable book ever education (Boyd, 1921, p. 301). 

The route through which Rousseau's ideas were transmitted is not hard to trace. The youthful Pestalozzi was mesmerised by Emile, and devoted to turning Rousseau's ideas into practice. Pestalozzi’s school at Yverdon received many visitors. With hindsight we can see that the most important was Friedrich Froebel, who spent two years working with Pestalozzi, and whose subsequent influence on early education was pervasive. 

The Plowden Report says that Froebel is the educational theorist most readily cited by primary head teachers. Plowden is itself very much part of this tradition, and today stands accused, perhaps improbably, of holding the minds of primary teachers in some kind of hypnotic sway. When the British Prime Minister, John Major, declared recently that 'progressive theorists have had their day', he probably had Plowden in mind rather than Rousseau. But the fact is that the history of progressive educational theory is a series of footnotes to Rousseau. 

Assessing Rousseau is therefore of perennial importance. In this article we shall offer a fresh assessment, and also examine how other commentators have reacted to him. The focus of the article, however, will not be the standard concerns about child-centred pedagogy, but Rousseau's less publicised relevance to another aspect of current education policy: equal educational opportunities for girls. While Rousseau's writing on education generally sounds progressive and enlightened, here the tone is different. A recent contributor to this journal (Hogan, 1992) speaks of 'Rousseau's thoroughly conformist views on the education of girls'. And Kate Millett has observed: 

Coming from a man who contributed so much to the French Revolution, Rousseau's impressions of proper education for women were as reactionary as they were influential ... (Millett, 1971, p. 74) 

Given Rousseau's pervasive influence, it is important to identify and clarify his underlying views on women. Believing that 'natural (sic) relations remain the same throughout the centuries', Rousseau thought women should continue to be dependent and submissive, while men should be dominant - ideas which were to be inculcated in Rousseau’s model male pupil, and which are still much in evidence in patriarchal society where they continue to lead, inevitably, to the abuse of women. In the light of this, we demonstrate in this article the inadequate treatment of Rousseau's views given by mainstream academic commentators. We then identify an element of Rousseau's thinking appears to have escaped attention altogether and which highlights the harmfulness of his attitudes to women then and now. Rousseau legitimises female subjection to male sexual advances as a form of punishment; he defends men who ignore women's refusal to sex; and he underwrites the tradition of refusing to believe subsequent declarations that they did not wish to have sex. In such scenarios male force is paramount: women's stated wishes and needs are not taken seriously. 

This conception of how males and females should relate underlies Rousseau’s thinking about the education of girls - and boys. If Emile has been as influential as has been suggested, its success must have effects for ill as well as for good. As a contribution to re-assessment of the legacy that Rousseau has left us, this article tries to ensure that henceforth a more realistic account is taken of his attitude to women. 

2.	ROUSSEAU ON THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN.

To establish the basis for Millett’s use of the word 'reactionary', we begin by explaining in general terms what Rousseau says in Emile about sex, power, women, and their education. The main preoccupation of this book is with the development of the eponymous pupil, whose education is supposed to represent what would now be called 'best practice'. Enthusiastic commentators have been tempted to portray Emile as Everychild. At an advanced stage of Emile’s development, however, he becomes emotionally involved with another character, Sophie, who becomes Emile's wife. The difference between her recommended upbringing and Emile's makes it clear that Emile is not Everychild but Everyboy. While Emile's education has been seen as a classic model for child-centred education leading to the development of the autonomous individual, Sophie's upbringing is untouched by any such progressive thinking: she is trained to fulfil the traditional roles of wife and mother. 

Although Rousseau makes much of women's dependence on men, Sophie is actually there because Emile needs her, suitably educated for service and forbearance. 
It is not good that man should he alone. Emile is now a man and we must give him his promised helpmeet (Rousseau, 1762, p. 321). 

In describing how women differ from men, Rousseau is not just writing from a male perspective; but assuming that his readers share this viewpoint: 

Let us inquire to begin with in what respects her sex differs from our own (sic) (p. 321). 

Despite a strong egalitarian strain in Rousseau (distinctions of rank, for example, are pronounced to be artificial), inequality between the sexes is seen not as a human construction, hut as something inherent in the nature of men and women. 

Vague assertions as to the equality of the sexes and the similarity of their duties are only empty words (p. 325). 

The differences between the sexes should be respected as 'nature's handiwork' (p. 326). Rousseau declares women superior to men in some (supposedly feminine) qualities. But if, in addition, they were to be men's equal in other respects, this would be 'to transfer to the woman the superiority which nature has given to her husband' (p. 345). While it may seem acceptable to advise someone 'to be what nature has made you' (p. 349), this principle seems less innocuous when coupled with Rousseau's claim that 'the law of nature bids woman obey the man' (p. 370). 

Much of the argument about the 'natural' way for the sexes to relate to each other derives from a particular view of the sex act - a view that is probably still common today. 

The man should be strong and active; the woman should be weak and passive; the one must have both the power and the will; it is enough that the other should offer little resistance. 

When this principle is admitted, it follows that woman is specially made for man's delight. If man in his turn ought to be pleasing in her eyes, the necessity is less urgent, his virtue is in his strength, he pleases because he is strong (p. 322). 

According to Rousseau, this is 'the first difference which may be observed between man and woman in their moral relations'. In this scenario, men do not need to try to please women, let alone find out what would be pleasing: they are naturally pleasing because of the kind of people they are - active and strong! The woman's function is to accommodate male wishes and desires, and not be difficult about it. 

Central to Rousseau's thinking is his view that women's natural role is motherhood: 'that is their proper business' (p. 325). Here, to twentieth-century eyes, Rousseau seems to make the argument easy for himself by failing to disentangle the physiology of childbearing from the caring and educational side of parental responsibility. 

The earliest education   ... undoubtedly is woman's work. If the author of nature had meant to assign it to men he would have given them milk to feed the child. (p. 5 n) 

From the role of motherhood, Rousseau deduces (among other things) that 
he (man) could do without her (woman) better than she can do without him. She cannot fulfil her purpose in life without his aid, without his goodwill, without his respect ... (thus) nature herself has decreed that woman, both for herself and her children, should be at the mercy of man's judgement (p. 328). 

This natural destiny dictates the form that a girl's education ought to take. 

When I consider the special purposes of woman, when 1 observe her inclinations or reckon up her duties, everything combines to indicate the mode of education she requires (pp. 327-8). 

A basic requirement, to Rousseau's mind, is docility: a woman must be taught docility if she is to be able to perform her duties. Happily this is not too difficult: 'women being made for dependence, girls feel themselves made to obey' (p. 333). A practical implication of this is that girls should be given little freedom. However, an unfortunate side effect of this policy, according to Rousseau, is that when they are given any freedom at all they may 'indulge themselves too fully' (p. 333). To solve this 'difficulty' Rousseau does not advocate increasing their freedom but, instead, seeks to train their ‘enthusiasm and 'fickleness of taste' into a 'habitual restraint' (p. 333). 

Habitual restraint produces docility which woman requires all her life long (for she will always be in subjection to man) (p. 333). 

Beyond general compliance, a girl should also learn how to manage a home and a family (p. 366), how to clean and cook; how to do the shopping and keep the family budget (p. 357). However, more important than this is that she has 

a thorough knowledge of man's mind     ... the mind of those men who have authority over her (p. 350). 

As well as knowing men's minds, females are also to cultivate their own minds. But what kind of mental development does Rousseau envisage? His model woman has a mind that is 

pleasing but not brilliant, and thorough but not deep ... When people talk to her they always seem to find what she says attractive (p. 358). 

So the point of a woman's learning is to enable her to make conversation that will entertain both her husband and his associates: in short, the woman is to be a social asset to the man. 

In sum, Rousseau wanted woman to be subservient, non-threatening, competent in useful homely arts, and ornamental in her ability to provide pleasing and attractive company. Ideally, she should 

cultivate the talents that will delight her husband as zealously as the Circassian cultivates the accomplishments of an Eastern harem (p. 337). 

Despite his generalizations about the nature of women, Rousseau recognizes individual differences in women as in men. Consequently there has to be discrimination - but to what end? Rousseau argues that a choice of wife must be made carefully, on the grounds that a mismatch will fail to bring happiness to the man. Here Rousseau is speaking as Emile's tutor: 

Instead of providing a wife for Emile in childhood, I have waited till I knew what would suit him ... Nothing but the pleasure of bestowing happiness on a man can repay me for the cost of making him capable of happiness (p. 369). 





In Vindication of the Rights Of Woman, Mary Wollstonecraft takes Rousseau to task for his arguments about women, which 'he pretends to draw from the indications of nature' (Wollstonecraft, 1792, p. 108). Firstly, it is, according to Wollstonecraft, unwise to substitute a training in allurement for education since, at best, a woman's sensual charms are likely to be effective for a limited period only (p. 187). Nor is it sound to depend for happiness on 'a being subject to like infirmities with herself (p. 11l). According to Rousseau
 
A good girl (sic) finds her own happiness in the happiness of a good man (p. 362). 

This suggests that good men are commonplace. By the end of this article when we show the kind of male behaviour, which Rousseau condones, this suggestion may seem questionable. But even if a good man to be found, it is, as Wollstonecraft points out, easily demonstrated that such dependency is undesirable: a husband may pre-decease a wife, and what then? As well as induced helplessness, Wollstonecraft points to another undesirable effect of dependency: because this puts the husband in a position to be domineering, the dominated wife is herself likely to be domineering towards her children (p. 135). (Significantly, for the eighteenth-century feminist, child rearing is accepted as a vital role for most women: so here at least one of Rousseau's premises remains unchallenged.) To make a good job of child rearing, Wollstonecraft thinks a woman requires an education, but, contrary to what Rousseau advocates, men and should acquire the same kind of knowledge and acquire it in the same way. 

Equally, according to Wollstonecraft, men and women should both build up their physical strength, albeit to different degrees. If, as Rousseau believes, strength is a virtue in men, why should women in being weak? According to Wollstonecraft, 

Rousseau has furnished them with a plausible excuse, which could only have occurred to a man whose imagination had been allowed to run wild, and refine on the impressions made by exquisite senses; that they might forsooth have a pretext for yielding to a natural appetite without violating a romantic species of modesty, which gratifies the pride and libertinism of man (p. 125). 

Wollstonecraft challenges the view that fearfulness should be acceptable in a woman. This characteristic, Wollstonecraft believes, is positively fostered, and possibly even created, in girls. Instead, she argues, girls who show fear should be treated in the same way as boys: criticized rather than indulged. So, contrary to stereotyped views of appropriate female characteristics, knowledge and strength are desirable for women, while timidity is undesirable. 

To facilitate the necessary changes in up bringing, Wollstonecraft advocates co-education, so that girls can experience the 'jostlings of equality’. Only if they develop along these lines will women become worthy of respect in their own right. In the way she presents this argument, Wollstonecraft seems to show a desire to reassure, lest men feel threatened. 

'Educate women like men,' says Rousseau, 'and the more they resemble our sex the less power they will have over us.' This is the very point 1 aim at. I do not wish them to have power over men, but over themselves (p. 154). 

The power of Rousseau himself Wollstonecraft locates in the brilliance of his eloquence:  this, she argues, allows him to present absurd ideas in a plausible light (p. 127). Her diagnosis of what she sees as pathological thinking is that: 

reflection inflamed his imagination instead of enlightening his understanding (p. 189). 

The drive behind his writing was 'refined licentiousness' (p. 188), and his arguments were created 'to give a little mock dignity to lust' (p. 173), judgments whose perspicacity will become apparent later in this paper. 

Wollstonecraft's cogent and forceful indictment constitutes a striking contrast to some anodyne commentary produced in the twentieth century, as will be demonstrated in what follows. We believe, however, that while Wollstonecraft is basically correct, she does not fully appreciate the perverse nature of Rousseau's attitude to women. 

4.	SOME UNSATISIFACTORY TWENTIETH-CENTURY COMMENTARY

In the 1980s Emile was portrayed as 

Rousseau's most completely achieved work, and a still much under-appreciated masterpiece (Dent, 1988, p. l). 

For mainstream academics who see Rousseau's contribution in a positive light, however, the sentiments highlighted earlier about the education of girls constitute considerable potential embarrassment. Here we will proceed to consider how three commentators have dealt with this illiberal aspect of Rousseau’s philosophy: an educationist, a professor of French, and a philosopher. 

Strategy (i): insufficient attention 

William Boyd, himself a significant figure in the development of child- centred education, shows in his full-length study that he understands Rousseau well. 

After sex, the most important fact for the person responsible for a child's education is undoubtedly the age of the child. On a superficial reading of Rousseau one might be tempted to think that he pays more regard to age than to sex ... There can be no doubt whatever that he regarded the sex-differences as the deepest of all the differences that distinguish individuals (Boyd, 1921, 244-5). 

This is clearly correct. Plato has a three-way classification of human nature corresponding to three social classes; and he minimises differences between the sexes to the point where he can envisage philosopher queens. Rousseau does the opposite: he minimises the difference between social classes and instead proposes a two-way classification of human nature according to sex. 

Despite Boyd's awareness of the importance Rousseau attaches to sex-difference, he shows little interest in what Rousseau actually says about the education of girls. Sophie is mentioned only twice in his book, both times in footnotes. The subject never appears in Boyd’s concluding chapter that explains his 'critical estimate'. Throughout this chapter 'child' and 'boy' are used interchangeably by Boyd as in, for example, 'A child is a child, and a man is a man.....’. This leads him into serious error when he claims Rousseau 

Does not want the child to be educated with direct reference to the future (p. 309). 

But, in the case of fifty per cent of children, this is exactly what Rousseau does want: girls should be prepared for becoming good wives. The fact that this kind of confusion would probably not be perpetrated today shows how much has been learned in the last two decades from the feminist critique of gender and language. 

Strategy (ii): total avoidance 

If Boyd pays rather miserly attention to what Rousseau says about women and their education, the strategy in Peter Jimack's book on Emile is more drastic. In his introduction he declares: 

… the education of Sophie was as remarkably unoriginal as that of Emile was original. No doubt Rousseau’s conviction that ‘la femme est faite spécialement pour plaire á l'homme' is not without a certain piquancy, but it does not seem to me to be worthy of serious consideration either as educational theory or for the light it throws on Rousseau's thought in general. I have therefore ignored it (Jimack, 1983, p. 12).

But the education of Sophie is not an irrelevant appendix that can be neatly excised as though it had been added as a casual and irrelevant afterthought. Rather, the way Emile is educated requires that Sophie be brought up differently. This close relationship between the education of one and the education of the other should not surprise us. Like any other educationist, Rousseau has in mind a desirable form of society, and his educational programme is developed with this kind of future in mind. Part of such a vision must be the way one sex relates to the other. Feminists have some such model in mind when they advance their educational proposals: Rousseau has a different model, stressing gender differences. Since any such vision necessarily involves both male and female, the education of each, whether different or not, must be closely interrelated. 

To give one example of interrelated difference: in religious Matters, Emile is encouraged to draw whatever theistic conclusion seems sound to him. But if Sophie were to do likewise, and reach a different conclusion, what would become of the domestic harmony by which Rousseau sets such cloying store? Necessarily, Sophie is brought up not to judge for herself, but to accept religious doctrine on authority: first she adopts her father's religion, then her husband's (p. 340). 

Further, Rousseau's view of the good man is that as well as being an independent thinker he is virtuous. What is likely to make men good and keep them good, according to Rousseau, is the experience of domestic life. Charmed by the woman obediently performing her natural, traditional duties, man will never be tempted to stray from the path of righteousness. This kind of moral glue requires that giris be educated in such a way that they become willing and able to perform the role of wife and mother. The proper development of the male therefore requires that females be brought up along very different lines: so the one form of education cannot be considered separately from the other. 

Strategy (iii): misrepresentation 

The third strategy for coming to terms with what Rousseau says about women is to suggest that in such matters, Rousseau is misunderstood. Thus Nicholas Dent concedes that: 

Rousseau tends to stress those aspects of Sophie's nature, dispositions, aptitudes, etc, which particularly bear on the possibility of her being one participant in a mutual reciprocal relation of passion with a man ... (Dent, 1938, p. 157) 

but claims that: 

This is not because he thought the only place suitable to a woman was to be a member of such a relation ... (p. 157). 

To show this claim to be untenable, however, we have only to return to Rousseau’s premise which Jimack found ‘piquant’: ‘la femme est faite spécialement pour plaire á l'homme'. Nor can the picture suggested by Dent be squared with what Rousseau says in Emile about women’s education, which ought to be planned

in relation to man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught (p. 328).

Dent also misrepresents the Rousseau model of sexual relations by refusing to recognise the extent to which control is central to it. See, for example, this expository passage (parenthesis as in Dent’s text):

… Emile (any lover) will not become the puppet and mock of his loved one (nor, more subtly want to turn her into his puppeteer and derider, as is done by lovers who can understand no terms for human relations than those of domination and subjection …) (p. 154).

While Dent may e right in saying there is not much mockery in Rousseau’s model relationship, ‘puppetry’ seems all too apt a descriptor. Certainly, the power does not lie entirely with one party; but, demonstrably, Rousseau’s analysis of the relationship between the sexes is conceived primarily in terms of control. In one passage, for example, the tutor advises Sophie to use her sexual attractions strategically:

You will long rule him by love if you make your favours scarce and precious, if you know how to use them aright. If you want to keep your husband always in your power, keep him at a distance (p. 443).

At another point in the narrative, the tutor describes how Emile gives to Sophie:

The authority of a betrothed, to decide what he shall do, to command instead of to ask …. But whatever her commands, they are obeyed without question, and often when at her bidding he is about to leave her, he glances at me his eyes full of delight, as if to say ‘You see she has taken possession of me’ (p. 387).

And in a melodramatic scene where Emile apparently performs the feat of simultaneously kissing her hand passionately and throwing himself at her feet, the newly wed declares: 

My dear wife ... be the arbiter of my pleasures as you are already the arbiter of my life and fate. Should your cruelty cost me life itself I would yield to you my most cherished rights (p. 441).

Such delight in subjection and abasement, however, is less frequently in evidence than Rousseau's enthusiasm for male power. Because of his vision of male physical dominance ('man pleases because he is strong'), Rousseau advocates the physical development of Emile through exercise and robust play. This, however, is not appropriate for girls:

Women were not meant to run: they flee that they may be overtaken (p. 400).

Because the weaker sex feel morally obliged to say 'no' whatever their actual wishes, men, Rousseau argues, should ignore what women say and instead interpret the expression in their eyes, the meaning of the way they breathe, etc (p. 348). Rather optimistically, Rousseau declares:

with delicacy and true love, will the lover ever be mistaken as to the real will? Will he not know when heart and eyes grant what the lips refuse? (p. 441)

But what will happen in situations that are relatively lacking in delicacy and true love? Will the man be able to recognise when heart and eyes do not grant what the lips refuse? Since Rousseau believes that 'woman is specially made for man's delight' (p. 322), and is the 'reward which he deserves' (p. 382), even a sensitive husband might feel it is his due to take what is rightly his. Yet, Rousseau readily admits that men might not always be so sensitive either. This, however, does not affect the basis of the relationship- the wife's position remains unaltered:

Woman is made to submit to man and to endure even injustice at his hands (p. 359).

This has implications for the education of women:

She should early learn to submit to injustice and to suffer the wrongs inflicted on her by her husband without complaint (p. 333).

Again, rather optimistically, Rousseau sees this as, at worst, a temporary strategy, since this self-sacrificing behaviour is bound to have a softening effect on the husband:

Sooner or later, a man, unless he is a perfect monster, (will) yield to his wife's gentleness (p. 334).

Thus, Rousseau's advocacy of the cultivation of sexual modesty and delicacy in women results in an argument that looks like a classic rationalisation of rape.

Although Rousseau admits that men can be brutal and sexually aggressive, he claims that unlike people of earlier civilizations

we rarely hear of violence for which there is so little occasion that it would hardly be credited (p. 323).

Women, after all, have the same needs as men (p. 348); and Rousseau seems to be suggesting that only unsophisticated societies would fail to recognise this:

If fewer deeds of violence are quoted in our days, it is not that men are more temperate, but because they are less credulous, and a complaint which would have been believed among a simple people would only excite laughter among ourselves; therefore silence is the better course (p. 324).

What is striking here is Rousseau's view that it is the mark of a civilised people that complaints of rape are disbelieved (at least by the male part of the population). Given that this scenario is all too realistic, the practical corollary is inevitably the one that still limits the lives of women: they should be very careful where they go and what situations they put themselves into. Rousseau cites an Old Testament rule which found the woman innocent and wronged only if sex had taken place in an isolated spot: otherwise, the argument went, she must have consented, because someone would have heard her screams. Rousseau approvingly comments:

From this merciful (sic) interpretation of the law, girls learned not to let themselves be surprised in lonely places (p. 324).

The problem here lies in Rousseau's conception of the sex act, which always involves the male boldly and vigorously overcoming varying degrees of female resistance, which itself is an inevitable consequences of women's modesty. Nature, according to Rousseau, 'has given the weaker party strength enough to resist if she chooses' (p. 323). [This idea was recently replicated by the judge who told a rape jury: 'lf she doesn't want it she only has to keep her legs shut.' (Guardian, 11 August, 1993, p. l)]. It follows from Rousseau's premise that if sexual intercourse takes place; the woman chose not to resist. Strictly, this makes rape a logically incoherent notion. 

Whether the woman shares the man's passion or not, whether she is willing or unwilling to satisfy it, she always repulses him and defends herself, though not always with the same vigour, and therefore not always with the same success. If the siege is to be successful, the besieged must permit or direct the attack (p. 323). 

Ingeniously, if unscrupulously, Rousseau presents the fact of relative female weakness as wholly consistent with this argument. 

...  far from being ashamed of her weakness, she is proud of it; her soft muscles offer no resistance, she professes that she cannot lift the lightest weight; she would be ashamed to be strong. And why? ... she is providing herself beforehand with excuses, with the right to be weak if she chooses (p. 323). 

Criticising the argument, Wollstonecraft says: 

These fundamental principles lead to a system of cunning and lasciviousness. (Wollstonecraft, 1792, p. 174) 

In case it seems unfair to cite passages about rape to cast doubts on Rousseau's credibility as an educational theorist, it should be made clear that there is a close connection between Rousseau's ideas on the education of women and his insistence that men are entitled to enjoy women's submission. This can be shown by examining Rousseau's highly revealing account of the extent to which Sophie should be educated prior to her marriage to Emile. 

Her education is neither showy nor neglected; she has taste without deep study, talent without art, judgment without learning. Her mind knows little, hut it is trained to learn; it is well-tilled soil ready for the sower ... 

What charming ignorance! Happy is he who is destined to be her tutor. She will not be her husband's teacher but his scholar ... and he will have the pleasure of teaching her everything (p. 373). 

The pleasure, or the anticipation of pleasure, is partly due to the contrast between one knowledgeable party and one ignorant party, which reinforces the imbalance of power enjoyed by the husband/teacher. For Rousseau, the ignorant young wife is educationally inexperienced, a cognitive virgin, ready and willing to co-operate in the loss of her innocence. Her husband is going to do to her what no one else has done: teach her! Of course, it is highly convenient for the male that the female is in this ignorant state. Without prior learning she has no basis for challenging what he tells her. She has no stock of pre-existing ideas that might be awkwardly at odds with her husband's views. Yet, teaching her is not going to be difficult, because despite her lack of education, her mind has (by some mysterious process) been trained to learn. Here we see a classic male fantasy resurfacing: the female offers little resistance to the male's designs. Once again, domination and subjection are seen to be central features of the male/female relationship. 

Yet Rousseau is not content to let his abuse of women stop there. Rousseau gives dominance one further twist with his rather unappetising illustration of female submission when Sophie attempts to re-establish her friendship with Emile (an attempt which he rejects, thereby causing her to cry). Rousseau makes Sophie's father say to Emile:

	If I were you …. I should punish the mouth that wronged me (p.390)

This ‘punishment’ consists of a kiss from which she: 

Turns away her head, and to save her mouth exposes a blushing cheek. The daring young man is not content with this; there is no great resistance.





The responses that we have analysed reveal an inability to grasp the sinister implications of Rousseau's view of women. Although Mary Wollstonecraft astutely accused Rousseau of indulging in 'voluptuous reveries’ (p. 107), even she failed to identify either the way in which Rousseau mentally linked teaching with sexual dominance or the way in which he legitimated rape. What is revealed in these fantasies is the importance he attached to power: in terms of personal experience, the only relationships with women that Rousseau could understand were those of slave (his relationships with aristocratic mistresses) or slave-owner (his relationship with a devoted uneducated partner-servant). In his Confessions he describes his behaviour towards the former: 

To fall on my knees before a masterful mistress, to obey her commands, to have to beg for her forgiveness, have been to me the most delicate of pleasures (Rousseau, 1781, p. 28). 

Anticipating twentieth-century self-analysis, Rousseau attributes these heterodox feelings to beatings he received as a child from a young female guardian with whom he had previously shared a bed. Clearly, this early personal experience of the erotic being associated with the punitive also underlies the episode described in the previous section where Emile uses kissing as a punishment. Rousseau recounts:

I had discovered in the shame and pain of the punishment an admixture of sensitivity that had left me rather eager than otherwise for a repetition by the same hand ... 

Who could have supposed that this childish punishment, received at the age of eight at the hands of a woman of thirty, would determine my tastes and desires, my passions, my very self for the rest of my life ... (pp. 25-6). 

His own long-term partner in real life was raised as a servant, was not in any way intellectually inclined, and was required to function mainly as his housekeeper and nurse. 

What will the reader think when 1 tell him, with all the sincerity that he has come to expect of me, that from the first moment I saw her till this day I have never felt least glimmering of love for her ... and that the sensual needs I satisfied with her were for me purely sexual and had nothing to do with her as an individual? (pp- 385-6) 

Before, however, we rush to conclude from these revelations that Rousseau’s observations on education for girls should be dismissed as idiosyncratic aberrations, we might consider whether his ideas have as limited currency as this would suggest. 

In the first hundred years of national public education, the education of girls has suffered from systemic limitations. If we claim that their education proceeded in the spirit of Rousseau, this is not to suggest that women’s education was conducted by men who were also their lovers. Rather it is to say that women were brought up to occupy roles in society that were generally acceptable. Since, however, positions of power and influence were generally occupied by men, what was 'socially acceptable' really means what was acceptable to men. Further, although much teaching of girls was done by women, the educational system itself was designed and managed by men. So, at least indirectly, women's education was directed by men in ways that were pleasing to men. This, of course, is not to say something new; but perhaps it is to present a well-established point in a fresh light. What is very obvious in the writing of Rousseau may be less obvious in the workings of an ostensibly rational, bureaucratic system since men are adept at concealing (from women and from themselves) the extent to which they wield power over women and the means (including education) by which they maintain that power. 

It is tempting to see as part of this unwitting concealment process the very failure of some commentators to face up to this side of Rousseau’s thinking. William Boyd gives it inadequate attention. Nicholas Dent, apparently wishing to show Rousseau in a more acceptable light, misrepresents his views, underplaying the importance Rousseau attached to power and control. And Peter Jimack simply refused to discuss the subject, maintaining that it throws little light 'on Rousseau’s thought in general'. We have argued that the reverse is true. The most charitable judgment that can be hoped for comes from Mary Wollstonecraft who says (of Rousseau) 

Some allowance should be made for a sex, who, like kings, always see things through a false medium (p. 128). 

Eighteenth-century enthusiasm for the liberation of all men from the rule of kings (which Rousseau helped to generate) obscured the needs of the less vocal half of the population. And this phenomenon has continued into the twentieth century. The case for revolution depended on demonstrating the rationality of all men, whether noble or commoner. This ensured that males were exalted, and patriarchal society given a new justification. 

Rousseau’s writing showed the condition of men in a light that was novel, exciting, and liberating. Existing patterns of social order were, he argued, socially created: they were hierarchical, exploitative, corrupting and inimical to human fulfilment. Since this framework was a human construction, however, it could be changed. A new social design, featuring both freedom and fraternity, would allow human nature to flourish. This analysis came to occupy a dominant position in western intellectual culture. But Rousseau failed to see that such an analysis could and should be equally applied to the position of women and to their educational needs. Rousseau's egalitarianism raised the status of men; but because they were not included in this philosophy, women were left in what one writer has called ‘the ontological basement’ (Martin, 1985). Given this difference in status, it is not surprising that relations between the two were envisaged along primitive lines: woman 'should offer little resistance'; man pleases because he is strong'. These sentiments are permissive in the worst sense: they sanction anything and everything except the woman’s right to reject. What amounts here to a licence to rape is a direct consequence of Rousseau's failure to extend his egalitarian principles beyond the male sex - the same failure that led him to commend for women an educational programme that is ultimately designed to meet the needs and wants of men.
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